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II 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael Byington appeals from the district court's Order Denying Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief. Mr. Byington asserts that the district court erred when it dismissed a 
claim he raised via a supplemental petition on the grounds that it had been waived 
because it was not contained in his initial petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Byington was convicted of aggravated assault following a jury trial. He 
received a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, which was suspended in 
favor of five years of probation. (R., p.4.) After he lost a motion for new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence, Mr. Byington appealed the denial of that motion, losing on 
direct appeal. State v. Byington, 2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 616 (Idaho Ct. App. 
2009). The post-conviction action underlying this appeal followed. 
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Byington raised a number of claims, 
all of which involve allegations that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at 
trial. 1 (R., p.5.) At the evidentiary hearing on the petition, counsel for Mr. Byington, the 
State's attorney, and the district court discussed a claim that was not raised in the initial 
petition for post-conviction relief. That claim concerned trial counsel's failure to file a 
motion to suppress evidence discovered during a warrantless, non-consensual search 
of Mr. Byington's residence, and post-arrest statements obtained during an interrogation 
1 None of the claims raised in the initial petition for post-conviction relief are being 




































of Mr. Byington prior to his being provided with Miranda2 warnings. (Tr., p.58, L.1 -
p.66, L.6.) Mr. Byington was allowed to present evidence in support of the new claim. 
(R., p.65.) 
After allowing evidence concerning the new claim to be presented, the district 
court issued an order requesting additional briefing on the claim. (R., pp.41-42.) In 
response to this order, counsel for Mr. Byington filed a Supplemental Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief and a supporting Memorandum of Additional Briefing. (R., pp.46-58.) 
The State then filed a Memorandum in Support of Objection to New Claim Not Raised in 
Petition in which it argued that the new claim "was known or should have been known 
by the petitioner at the time of the filing of his petition" and, as such, was "permanently 
waived" when it was not included in the first petition.3 (R., pp.60-61 (citing Palmer v. 
Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591 (1981), and Stuartv. State, 118 Idaho 932 (1990)).) 
Ultimately, the district court issued an Order Denying Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief in which it rejected the new claim as follows: 
The Petitioner attempted to and in fact was allowed by the Court to 
introduce evidence of an alleged illegal custodial interrogation and 
subsequent search. These matters were not raised in the original Petition 
for Post Conviction Relief. Therefore, the Court now rules that those 
claims were waived and will not be considered. 
(R., p.65.) Mr. Byington filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the judgment dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief. (R., p.69.) 
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3 The State also provided argument disputing the merits of the new claim. (R., pp.61-
63.) It is not necessary to recount the State's argument on the merits, as the district 
court declined to consider the new claim on the merits, instead accepting the State's 
waiver argument. (R., p.65.) 
2 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it found Mr. Byington's suppression related claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel to be waived because it was not in his original petition? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Found Mr. Byington's Suppression Related Claim Of 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel To Be Waived Because It Was Not In His Original 
Petition 
A. Introduction 
The State's argument, adopted by the district court, that by not raising the 
suppression motion claim in his original post-conviction petition he waived the claim, is 
unsupported by the case law cited by the State and is, in fact, incorrect as a matter of 
law. As such, the district court's refusal to consider his suppression motion claim on the 
merits was error, and this matter must be remanded to the district court for 
consideration on the merits. 
8. The District Court Committed Erred When It Found Mr. Byington's Suppression 
Claim To Be Waived Because It Was Not In His Original Petition 
In opposing Mr. Byington's Supplemental Petition for Post Conviction Relief, the 
State argued, 
Claims that are not asserted in a Petition for Post-conviction Relief are 
deemed waived. Idaho Code § 19-4908 requires that all legal and factual 
grounds for relief must be raised in the first petition for post-conviction 
relief. Any grounds for relief not raised are permanently waived if the 
grounds were known or should have been known at the time of the first 
petition. Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 955 {1981). In the 
presentation of the substantive case and as shown by the testimony of 
Mr. Porter, the sequence of the defendant's interaction with Officer Young 
relating to the consent to retrieve the weapon was used by the defense to 
show that the defendant was cooperative. It was clearly an issue that was 
known to counsel and the defendant. Specifically, the officer was 
questioned as follows: 
Q: Now, you said you gave him - you didn't really speak 
with him, that you simply gave him instructions? 
A: Correct[.] 
Q: Did he comply with all of those instructions? 
4 
A: Yes, he did. 
Q: Was he belligerent in any way? 
A: No, not at all. 
Q: And then you placed him in your patrol car? 
A: Correct[.] 
Trial transcript Page 116, lines 16-25. The sequence of the contact and 
subsequent consent was well established during trial and was known or 
should have been known by the petitioner at the time of the filing of his 
petition. Any grounds for relief not raised are permanently waived if the 
grounds were known or should have been known at the time of the first 
petition. Stuartv. State, 118 Idaho 932,801 P.2d 1283 (1990). 
(R., pp.60-61.) 
The district court declined to reach the merits of Mr. Byington's new claim, 
instead adopting the State's waiver argument. Specifically, the district court held, 
The Petitioner attempted to and in fact was allowed by the Court to 
introduce evidence of an alleged illegal custodial interrogation and 
subsequent search. These matters were not raised in the original Petition 
for Post Conviction Relief. Therefore, the Court now rules that those 
claims were waived and will not be considered. 
(R., p.65.) An examination of the case law and statutory authority cited by the State in 
support of its waiver argument demonstrates that both the district court and the State 
have misinterpreted the law on this issue. 
What the State failed to note in its response opposing Mr. Byington's 
Supplemental Petition was that the portion of the Stuart opinion from which it quoted (it 
neglected to place quotation marks around what was an exact quote from Stuart)4 is 
followed by two additional sentences that clarify that the State's reading of the case 
(and Idaho Code § 19-4908) is absolutely wrong. The complete paragraph from which 




















Idaho Code § 19-4908 requires that all legal and factual grounds for relief 
must be raised in the first petition for post-conviction relief. Any grounds 
for relief not raised are permanently waived if the grounds were known or 
should have been known at the time of the first petition. Subsequent 
petitions are allowed if the appellant states a sufficient reason for not 
asserting the grounds in the earlier petition. Hence, there is no absolute 
prohibition against successive petitions for relief. Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 
Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 955 (1981). 
Stuart, 118 Idaho at 933-34 (emphasis added). 
It makes sense that the Court in Stuart would opine about successive petitions, 
considering the fact that Stuart had filed a successive petition5 which had been 
dismissed and which was the subject of the appeal. Id. at 933. The relevance and 
applicability of the Stuart case to the facts of this case are limited in that Mr. Byington 
had not filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief; rather, he had presented 
evidence concerning a new claim, with the permission of the district court, and did so 
via a Supplemental Petition for Post Conviction Relief, through which he was 
supplementing his first (and only) petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.46-58, 65.) 
An examination of the text of the statute provides further support for 
Mr. Byington's argument that a supplemental petition is a part of the original petition for 
post-conviction relief. Idaho Code § 19-4908 provides: 
All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must be 
raised in his original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground 
finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or 
sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure 
relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court 
finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not 
4 The specific language taken from Stuart and used by the State in its memorandum is, 
"Any grounds for relief not raised are permanently waived if the grounds were known or 
should have been known at the time of the first petition." (R., p.61.) 
5 It was styled as a "Second and Subsequent Petition for Post-Conviction Relief." Id. at 
933. 
6 
asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or 
amended application. 
I.C. § 19-4908 (emphases added). 
Interpreting the statute with respect to successive petitions, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has held, 
The intent of this language is clear: all allegations relating to a request for 
postconviction relief should be asserted in one petition. However, the 
language of I.C. s 19-4908 does not prohibit successive petitions for 
postconviction relief in every case, but rather, only prohibits successive 
petitions in those cases where the petitioner "knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently" waived the grounds for which he now seeks relief, or offers no 
"sufficient reason" for the omission of those grounds in his "original, 
supplemental or amended petition." Thus, it is necessary that the trial 
court find the failure to include newly asserted grounds for relief in the 
prior postconviction relief proceeding was without sufficient reason before 
the application may be summarily dismissed on the ground of waiver. 
Palmer, 102 Idaho at 593 (emphasis added). This passage from Palmer and the plain 
language of the statute make it clear that the original, supplemental, and amended 
petitions are to be considered part of a single petition made within a single post-
conviction relief proceeding. It is only when a new, successive petition, initiating a 
successive proceeding, is filed that the issue of waiver of a claim or claims arises. 
The district court was misled by the State's failure to provide the full context for 
the authorities cited, and erred when it found the suppression related claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel to be waived and dismissed the claim without considering it on its 
merits. As such, this Court should vacate that portion of the district court's Order 
Denying Petition for Post Conviction Relief in which it concluded that the suppression 
related ineffective assistance of counsel issue was waived, and remand this matter for 
the district court to consider that claim on its merits. 
7 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Byington respectfully requests that this 
Court vacate the portion of the district court's Order Denying Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief dismissing his suppression related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
without considering it on its merits, and remand this matter to the district court for a 
consideration of the claim on its merits. 
DATED this 28th day of February, 2012. 
\Q~pu ,y State Appellate Public Defender 
~ 
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